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Entry and Exit Strategies in Migration Dynamics 
Summary 
This work is devoted to study the role of combined entry and exit strategies in the 
migration process. We develop a real option model in which the community of 
immigrants in the host country is described as a club and the immigrants benefits is a U-
shaped function, depending on the dimension of the district. There exist two threshold 
levels: the first one triggers the migration choice, while the second triggers the return to 
the country of origin. The theoretical results show that the phenomenon of hysteresis is 
amplified by the existence of a community both in the entry case and in the exit case. 
Furthermore, the community can reduce the minimum wage level required to trigger 
both exit and entry: this fact could explain why in some cases we observe migration 
inflows with a low wage differential and also with underunemployment. We show also 
some possible further extensions of the model: in one case we introduce a possible way 
to select the entrants. skills and in another case we show some theoretical 
implementations to include possible policy shocks in the migrant’s choice. 
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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Generally, in economic literature, migration choice depends on the wealth diﬀer-
ence between the country of origin and the host country, because mainly "people
migrate in order to increase their welfare"1. The wage diﬀerential between the
host country and the country of origin is assumed as the main variable aﬀecting
migration (Todaro, 1969; Langley, 1974; Hart, 1975; Borjas, 1990, 1994), even if
it is not suﬃcient to totally explain migrant behaviour: evidence seems to stress
the focal role of community networks in the migrant￿s choice (Boyd, 1989; Bauer
and Zimmermann, 1997; Winters et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2002; Coniglio, 2003;
Munshi, 2001, 2003; Heitmueller, 2003). Moretti (1999), for example, with an
alternative model to Todaro￿s, ￿nds evidence that both the timing and the des-
tination of migration could be explained by the presence of social networks in
the host country. Another work (Bauer, Epstein and Gang, 2002) examines the
relative importance and interaction of two alternative explanations of immigrant
clustering: 1) network externalities and 2) herd behaviour. The same theme is
studied in Epstein and Gang (2004), where the authors examine the roles "other
people" play in in￿uencing an individual￿s potential migration decision. In fact,
the moment immigrants settle in a country, they have to acquire a place in that
new society. This is true not only for physical needs such housing, but also in
the social and cultural sense.
Integration is the process by which immigrants become accepted into society,
both as individuals and as groups. Therefore, the process of integration is not
only taking place - as is often supposed - at the level of the individual immigrant,
b u ta l s oa tt h ecollective level of the immigrant group. In fact, when a immigrant
enters a new society, she begins to build a group of people (or she enters a
group if is already exists), based on aﬃnities, religions and the same way of
life: this group is generally called "community". In addition, the process of
integration is related to the level of institutions, which come in two broad types.
The ￿rst are general public institutions of receiving societies or cities, such as
the education system or institutional arrangements in the labour market or the
dimension of the urban area in which the community develops. The second kind
of institution belongs to speci￿c types of immigrant group themselves, such as
religious or cultural institutions. This aggregate of individuals that uses, like a
family, the same goods, ￿deriving mutual beneﬁt sharing [...] production costs,
the members’ characteristics, or a good characterised by excludable beneﬁts￿, can
be modelled by following economic theory of "club" (Sandler and Tschirhart,
1980; Buchanan, 1965; Berglas, 1976, Vergalli, 2006).
Furthermore, the fact that the migration decision is in many cases at least
partially irreversible, is a third element that has been studied in economic theo-
ries. In this respect, Burda (1995), following a real option approach, implements
Sjaastad￿s assumption (1962) that describes migration choice in terms of invest-
ment. Burda￿s results show that individuals prefer to wait before migrating,
even if the present value of the wage diﬀerential is positive, because of the un-
1Khwaja, Y., ￿Should I Stay or Should I Go? Migration Under Uncertainty: A Real Option
Approach￿, mimeo, March, 2002
2c e r t a i n t ya n dt h es u n kc o s t sa s s o c i a t e dw i t hm i g r a t i o n2. Subsequently Khwaja
(2002) Anam et al., (2004), Moretto and Vergalli (2005), developed Burda￿s ap-
proach by describing the role of uncertainty in the migration decision. Another
w o r kt h a tu s e sr e a lo p t i o nw i t hr e s p e c tt oa na r g u m e n tt h a ti ti ss t r i c t l yr e l a t e d
to migration is Feist￿s (1998) paper, in which the author analyses the option
value of the low-skilled workers to escape to the unoﬃcial sector if welfare ben-
e￿ts come too close to the net wage in the oﬃcial sector. In a recent work,
Vergalli (2006) studies migration choice by merging in a uni￿ed framework the
real option approach of investment decision and the works on the classical theory
of clubs.
So far, the theoretical approaches that use real option framework to study
migration choice, assume that migration is an irreversible choice. Nevertheless,
migration could also be thought as the combined eﬀect of entry and exit strate-
gies. By following this idea, this paper is devoted to develop Vergalli (2006)￿s
framework by studying a more general approach that includes the possibility
that each migrant could go back to his country, following Dixit-Pindyck (1993)
and Khwaja (2002). What does it change in the migration choice? What happen
in the labour market?
By trying to answer to these questions, this paper is organised as follows:
section 2 presents the model and the basic assumptions; section 3 develops
the theoretical framework that combines real option theory and the network
eﬀects, namely the optimal migration strategy in the presence of positive and
negative externalities and show the main results; ￿nally, section 4 summarises
the conclusions.
2 The Model
This section presents a continuous-time model of migration where the diﬀerential
bene￿ts of migration, including the wage diﬀerential, evolves in a stochastic
manner over time and there is ongoing uncertainty.
We can summarise our assumptions in the following manner:
1. There exist two countries: the country of origin where each potential
migrant takes her decision and the host country.
2. At any time t each individual is free to decide to migrate to a new country.
Individuals discount the future bene￿ts at the interest rate ρ.
3. All immigrants are identical, are in￿nitely-lived, or choose vicariously for
their descendants who will remain in the receiving country forever3.T h e i r
2Investment is de￿ned as the act of incurring an immediate cost in the expectation of
future payoﬀ. However, when the immediate cost is sunk (at least partially) and there is
uncertainty over future rewards, the timing of the investment decision becomes crucial (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994, p.3).
3It is possible to show that the "sudden death" formulation is a very natural generalisation
of the in￿nite-life case (Dixit and Pindyck, 1993, p.205).
3size dn is in￿nitesimally small with respect to the total number of inhab-
itants.
4. Each individual enters a new country undertaking a single irreversible
investment which requires an initial sunk cost K.i fh ew a n t e dt or e t u r n
to his country he ought to cope with another sunk cost, called E.
5. The migrant faces some known constant variable costs of operation, called
C4.This latter cost might include legally required termination payments
for houses, the buildings of the community he decided to sustain, the costs
for buying a return ticket to his country and the loss of some businesses
underway.
6. The wage diﬀerential for each migrant, called x, follows a geometric diﬀu-
sion process:
dx = αxdt + σxdw (1)
with x0 = x and α,σ>0. The component dw is a Weiner disturbance de-
￿ned as dw(t)=ε(t)
√
dt,w h e r eε(t) ∼ N(0,1) is a white noise stochastic
process (see Cox and Miller, 1965). The Weiner component dw is there-
fore normally distributed with zero expected value and variance equal to:
dw ∼ N(0,dt). From these assumptions and from the (1) we know that
E [dw]=0 ; E [dx]=αxdt.
7. In the host country there is a community of ethnically homogeneous in-
dividuals. Each individual becomes a member (￿nding a job) instanta-
neously when she enters the host country.
8. The community net bene￿t function for each member is U-shaped with
regards to the number of members and can be modelised by using "theory
of clubs" as in Vergalli (2006). Formally, for a given level of common
public good J (i.e. in the instant t), the migrant￿s utility function can be
reduced to:
U(x,n)=x + θu(n) (2)
where θ is a scale factor. The function u(n) is twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable in n, and it is increasing over the interval [0,n) and decreasing thereafter.
Furthermore, if the initial level of the public good is not the optimal one, when
J increases the maximum in n (i.e. u(n)) increases.
Proof. see Vergalli (2006).
4That could represent the costs of integration.
43R e s u l t s
As far as real option framework is concerned, we will observe two new threshold
wages: an upper bound
¡
xh¢
and a lower bound (xl). If the shock crosses
the upper bound, then the immigrant enters the host country, otherwise, if the
shocks is below xl then the migrant returns to his country of origin. We will also
distinguish between the value of staying idle (V0) and the value of belonging to
the host country, (V1).
Let us start with the idle entrant. The resulting equation is a diﬀerential






0 (x) − ρV0 (x)=0 (3)
This has the general solution:
V0 (x)=A1xβ1 (4)
This value is valid over the interval (0,x h).






1 (x,n) − ρV0 (x,n)+x − C + θu(n)=0 (5)
The general solution of this equation is:






w h e r et h el a s tt h r e et e r m sa r et h ev a l u eo fr e m a i n i n gi nt h ec o u n t r yd e s p i t e
any losses and the ￿rst two terms are the value of the option to abandon the
country. Because the value of the abandonement option should go to zero as
x becomes very large, the coeﬃcient B1 corresponding to the positive root β1








this is valid for x in the range (xL,∞) 5.
Now, to analyse the eﬀect of the community on the decision to migrate and
to return home, we de￿ne the following function:
G(x,n)=V1 (x,n) − V0 (x)=







5In Appendix A, we explain how it is possible to ￿nd the value of the parameters of these
equations, following the methodology of Dixit and Pindyck.
5where G(x) represents on the interval (wL,w H) the migrant’s incremental
value of migrating. If the same function without the presence of the community
is:
G(x)=V1 (x) − V0 (x)=







It is easy to demonstrate the role of the community in the de￿nition of the
trigger value for entering or for returning to the country of origin. Let us observe
the following ￿gure obtained by (7) - blue and black line - and (8) - red line.
  G(x,n)
 I      I
  x*L x’L xL x*H x’H   xH      x
 -E      -E
   G(x)
     G(x,n)      G(x,n’)
Figure 1: Entry and exit strategies.
The following comments are obtained by comparing the entry-exit strategy
without community (8) with respect the same strategy with community (7)
The role of the community for the entry-exit migrant￿s choice has the following
eﬀects:
1. the greater the number of members of the community for a given dimension
of J, the lower the trigger value xH at which each individual decides to
migrate (for n<n). This fact implies that the higher the number of
members for n ∈ (0,n), the earlier the migration starts;
2. the greater the number of members of the community, for a given di-
mension J, the lower the trigger value of exit xL This fact magni￿es the
phenomenon of hysteresis to remain in the host country even if the level
6of the migrant￿s wage is low. And the greater the bene￿tc o m i n gf r o mt h e
community, the lower the level of wage that each member needs to remain,
because of a high network eﬀect. Therefore, if the value of the U function
is suﬃciently high, the individual will remain for low level of wage. These
two insights could explain why we sometimes observe migration in￿ows in
countries with high unemployment rates and low average wages.
3. by appendix B we show that the migration thresholds xH rises and xL falls
with the investment cost K. This important interaction between the costs
and thresholds should also be intuitive upon re￿ection. The individual
abandons the community with some reluctance because of his option value.
By staying in the community, he avoids incurring the investment cost
once again should the wage process become suﬃciently favorable in the
future. Therefore, the larger the investment cost, the larger is this option
value and the greater is the reluctance to abandon. The mirror image
result, namely, that the migration threshold xH rises and xL falls as the
abandonment cost E increases, is perhaps even clearer. The individual is
more reluctant to undertake the project if he might have to incur a greater
cost of shutting it down in the future. The role of the community consists in
modifying the eﬀect of a change in K: if the migration cost increases, the
entry threshold xH raises lower than in the case of community￿s absence
and the exit￿s threshold falls more than in the case of no community.
In conclusion,
Proposition 1 "the existence of a community of immigrants in the host
country magniﬁes the hysteresis’ phenomenon. This fact explains migra-
tion inﬂows in presence of high unemployment rates and low wages".
4. By Dixit and Pindyck: "a project with higher operating cost is undertaken
more reluctantly and abandoned sooner". For the previous conclusions,
the community reduces the ￿rst and increases the second eﬀect.
3.1 Harris_Todaro paradox
In two seminal papers, Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) have de-
veloped a canonical model of rural-urban migration. The main idea is quite
simple since it says that migration will occurs as long as the urban expected
income (i.e. income times the probability to ￿nd an urban job) is higher than
the rural one. These papers have been so in￿uential that they are referred in
the literature to as the Harris-Todaro model. One of the main issues raised in
these papers was that creating urban jobs may increase rather than decrease
urban unemployment because of the induced negative eﬀect on rural migration,
which may outweight the positive eﬀect of creating jobs (Todaro, 1976). This
is referred to as the Todaro paradox.
The paradox is due to the assumptions that in choosing between labour
markets, risk-neutral agents consider expected wages; that the probability of
7obtaining urban employment is approximated by the ratio of urban jobs to the
urban labor force; and that the urban wage rate is considerably and consistently
higher than the rural wage rate. Under these assumptions, inter-labour market
(rural-urban) equilibrium mandates urban unemployment. This unemployment
ensures that the expected urban wage is equal to the rural wage (which is as-
sumed constant throughout). The repercussion of this simple set of assumptions
is that contrary to received wisdom, once the migration response is factored in,
several policies aimed at reducing urban unemployment will raise urban un-
employment rather than reduce it. In the Harris-Todaro model migration is
regarded as the adjustement mechanism by which workers allocate themselves
between diﬀerent labor markets, some of which are located in urban areas and
some in rural areas, while attempting to maximize their expected incomes. The
eﬀects of the model described above, change the magnitudo and the sign of
the Harris-Todaro (1970) paradox: by reducing the threshold level to migrate
(i.e. the minimum wage) with respect to a labour market without community,
the unemployment rate is not so eﬃcient to counterbalance the migration in-
￿ows. In this case the Todaro paradox is diluted. This eﬀect is similar to a
reduction of "unemployment bene￿t" imposed by the goverment as descirbed
in Zenou (2005). In their framework, a Todaro paradox exists if a reduction
in the urban unemployment bene￿t (exogenous variable and policy instrument)
leads to an increase of both urban employment and unemployment. This is a
paradox since a reduction in the unemployment bene￿t has the natural eﬀect
to increase urban employment but the counterintuitive eﬀect to also increase
urban unemployment.
In the case of a search-matching model where wages are bargained, a Todaro
paradox may exist if a condition on parameters is satis￿ed. Indeed, the bene￿t
of community has a direct positive eﬀect on bargained wages. As a result,
because it is cheaper and thus more pro￿table to hire a worker, more ￿rms
enter the urban labor market and more jobs are created, and thus rural-urban
migration increases. However, when the community bene￿t decreases, there is
also a direct negative eﬀect on migration since urban wages are lower and thus
less rural workers migrate. The net eﬀect is thus ambiguous. A condition that
guarantees that the indirect positive eﬀect on migration is larger than the direct
negative eﬀect leads to a Todaro paradox since a reduction in community bene￿t
increases in this case both urban employment and unemployment.
3.2 Eﬀects of community in countries with centralised wage-
setting and no labour mobility
Another insight rises with respect to a two-countries centralised wage-setting
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Figure 2: Eﬀects of community in countries with centralised wage-setting and
no labour mobility.
In presence of wage compressing institutions, international migration can re-
duce unemployment also in the low-productivity (high-unemployment) regions.
This additional ￿greasing the wheels￿ eﬀect of migration is visually characterised
in the above diagram. The panel on the left-hand side shows the market-clearing
wage prevailing in the dynamic regions (called here the Rich or North) which
is also paid ￿ due to the imposition of the same contractual minima through-
out the country ￿ in the Poor or South. At the initial equilibrium, the South
experiences unemployment as the Northern wage acts as a binding minimum
wage. Migration has two useful functions in this context. On the one hand, it
increases employment and reduces wages in the North by shifting to the right
labour supply (as shown by the blue line, S￿). On the other hand, migration, by
acting on Northern wages, reduces labour costs also in the South (from w to w*)
allowing partially to absorb its unemployment pool there (which shrinks from
u to u*). As observed above, the community reduces the entry-exit threshold,
that is, the centralised minimum wage. Therefore, the eﬀect is an increase in
the supply to the red dotted line, by increasing the number of immigrants. The
consequence is a rise of the employment (E") in the rich region and a reduction
of the unemployment rate in the poor region (u").
94 Some extensions
So far, we have studied the role of the community in the entry and exit of a
migrant, developing a model quite similar to Burda and implementing an ex-
tension taken from the theory of club. We have observed that a homogeneous
community of individuals reduces the trigger level at which the individual de-
cides to migrate and also reduces wage level at which each migrant wants to go
back. We have assumed that all the individuals are homogeneous and we haven￿t
take into account any policy choice. Now we would like to generalise the model
in a simple manner, considering two possible implementations.
Taking into account the possibility of diﬀerent skills among the migrants, we
could assume that they are able to gain higher wages, the higher their levels of
skill. That is, in a simple manner we could assume that the value of migrating






(Ψix + θu(n))e−ρt |n0 = n,θ0 = θ,x0 = x|


with Ψi > Ψj, if the skill level i is greater than j.
By this function and following the previous method, it is possible to demon-
strate that the ￿rst in￿o ww o u l db ec o m p o s e do fh i g hs k i l l s ,b e c a u s eo fag r e a t e r
bene￿t for the same shock x. Furthermore, for the same reason they would re-
main more time than the others. Nevertheless, increasing the number of the
community￿s members, the bene￿t should increase, ceteris paribus.T h i s f a c t
should mean a reduction of the threshold level and the entry also of low-skill
immigrants. A possible policy for selecting the migrants￿skills, could consist in
increasing entry costs, as Urrutia (2001) suggests. However, as we have seen,
this policy option would increase the hysteresis phenomenon of remaining in
the community. Furthermore, the policy makers generally help the integration
of new groups because of their lower possibilities. Although this policy choice
is right for ethic reasons, it would not only stimulate migration, increasing the
phenomenon of hysteresis but also reduce the average level of migrants￿ skills.
Governments can not only deploy measures to reduce the uncertainty fac-
ing potential investors, they can also create uncertainty through the prospect
of policy change. This feature of the policy process is relevant in migration
analysis because a new law could increase or reduce the costs of integration of
all immigrants. It is commonly believed that expectations of shifts in policy
can have powerful eﬀects on decisions to invest. We show a possible analytical
implementation in appendix C.
105C o n c l u s i o n s
In this work we study the role of combined entry and exit strategies in the mi-
gration process. We develop a real option model in which the community of
immigrants in the host country is described as a club and the immigrant￿s ben-
e￿ts is a U-shaped function, depending on the dimension of the district. This
framework is in line with Vergalli(2006). In particular, in the present paper,
we apply some extensions taken from Dixit and Pindyck (1993, pp. 217-222)
regarding the combined entry and exit strategies of migrants: there exists a
threshold that triggers the entry and a second that triggers the return to the
country of origin. The theoretical results show that the phenomenon of hys-
teresis is ampli￿ed by the existence of a community both in the entry case and
in the exit case. Furthermore, the community can reduce the minimum wage
level required to trigger both exit and entry: this fact could explain why in
some cases we observe migration in￿ows with a low wage diﬀerential and also
with underunemployment as previously shown by Todaro (1970). This impor-
tant result shows some theoretical implications: in a framework with centralised
wage-setting and no labour mobility (Boeri and Br¤ ucker, 2005), the consequence
is a rise of the employment in the rich region and a reduction of the unemploy-
ment rate in the poor region, because of a reduction minimum wage and an
increase in the labour supply. We show also some possible further extensions
of the model: in one case we introduce a possible way to select the entrants￿
skills and in another case we show some theoretical implementations to include
possible policy shocks in the migrant￿s choice.
11A Combined entry and exit strategies
Let us start with the idle entrant. The resulting equation is a diﬀerential equa-






0 (x) − ρV0 (x)=0 (9)
This has the general solution:
V0 (x)=A1xβ1 + A2xβ2































We know that the coeﬃcient A2, corresponding to the negative root β2, must
be zero. This fact leaves:
V0 (x)=A1xβ1 (10)
This value is valid over the interval (0,x h).






1 (x,n) − ρV0 (x,n)+x − C + θu(n)=0
The general solution of this equation is:






w h e r et h el a s tt h r e et e r m sa r et h ev a l u eo fr e m a i n i n gi nt h ec o u n t r yd e s p i t e
any losses and the ￿rst two terms are the value of the option to abandon the
country. Because the value of the abandonement option should go to zero as
x becomes very large, the coeﬃcient B1 corresponding to the positive root β1








this is valid for x in the range (xL,∞).
In Appendix A, we explain how it is possible to ￿nd the value of the param-
eters of these equations, following the methodology of Dixit and Pindyck. Now,
12to analyse the eﬀect of the community on the decision to migrate and to return
home, we de￿ne the following function:
G(x,n)=V1 (x,n) − V0 (x)=







where G(x) represents on the interval (wL,w H) the migrant’s incremental
value of migrating. If the same function without the presence of the community
is:
G(x)=V1 (x) − V0 (x)=







So, following the methodology of Dixit and Pindyck, we could solve (4) and
(6) using the conditions of value matching and smooth pasting:















































The four equations determine the four unknow values.
BC o m p a r a t i v e s t a t i c s
Although the equations de￿ning the thresholds are highly nonlinear and do
not have closed-form solutions, the total diﬀerentials corresponding to small
13changes in exogenous parameters are, as usual, linear. This makes it relatively
straightforward to obtain qualitative comparative statics results for at least
some parameters. We show the eﬀects of the investment cost K in detail and
the eﬀects of E and C are similar.
Working with the function G remains useful, and it helps to show its de-
pendence on the option value coeﬃcients. Thus we write G(x,A1,B 2).T h e
value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions are:
G(xH,A 1,B 2)=K, G(xL,A 1,B 2)=−E (18)
GP (xH,A 1,B 2)=0 ,G P (xL,A 1,B 2)=0 (19)
Now suppose that I changes by dI, and consider how the four endogenous
variables A1, B2, xL and xH respond. Begin by diﬀerentiating the value-
matching conditions (18) totally. Denote the partial derivatives of G by sub-
scripts as usual, and write GA(xH,A 1,B 2)=GA(H),e t c . ,f o rb r e v i t y . W e
obtain:
GA (H)dA1 + GB (H)dB2 = dK
GA (L)dA1 + GB (L)dB2 =0
Note that the terms GP(H)dxH and GP(L)dxL have vanished because of
the smooth-pasting conditions (19). Therefore the general comparative static
system in the four endogenous changes dA1, dB2, dxL,a n ddxH in fact separates
in a simpler manner. First we solve the above two equations for the changes
in the option value coeﬃcients dA1, dB2. Then we can totally diﬀerentiate the
smooth-pasting conditions to obtain the changes in the thresholds dxH,dx L.
Noting that GA(H)=x
β1





















which is positive because xH >x L and β1 > 0 >β 2.
Now diﬀerentiate the smooth-pasting condition at xH in (19) to write
Gxx (H)dxH + GxA (H)dA1 + GxBdB2 =0
which yields














14Since G(x) is concave at xH, Gxx(H) is negative and then dxH > 0 when
dK > 0. The investment threshold rises with the investment cost, as we should
expect. Similarly, xL falls as E rises.
Similarly, the lower smooth-pasting condition gives:





Since Gxx(L) > 0,w eh a v edPL < 0 when dK > 0.
C Policy Uncertainty
Dixit and Pindyck (1993) aﬃrm that "policy uncertainty is not likely to be well
captured by a Brownian motion process; it is more likely to be a Poisson jump".
Therefore our model changes in the following manner:
if θ follows a jump process, we write this compactly by analogy with the
notation for Brownian motion as:
dθ = γθdt+ θdq (20)
where dq is the increment of a Poisson process with mean arrival rate γ,
and dq is independent from dw.[ s ot h a tE (dzdq)=0 ]. We will assume that if
an "event" occurs, q falls by some ￿xed percentage with probability 1.B yt h e





Let us denote (Dixit and Pindyck , 1993, p.85) a Poisson process by analogy
with the weiner process. In other words, let dq be equal to 0 with probability
1 −  dt and equal to −φ with probability  dt, so that
E (dθ)=γθdt− θφ dt
If the two variables x and θ follow respectively a geometric brownian motion
and a jump process we can use It
ˆ

















And substituting (1), (20), into (21), dividing all by dt and rearranging we











∂x2 σ2x2 +  {V [(1 − φ)x] − V (x)} (22)





















θγ − (ρ +  )V +  V [(1 − φ)x]+[ x + θu(n)]
(23)

















= uf (s) − usf0 (s) (24)





σ2x2 + f0 (s)αx +[ uf (s) − usf0 (s)]θγ − (ρ +  )θuf (s)+ (25)
+ θuf [(1 − φ)s]+[ x + θu(n)] (26)
rearranging and dividing all by θu
1
2
f￿(s)σ2s2 + f0 (s)s[α − γ] − f (s)[  + ρ − γ]+ f [(1 − φ)s]+s +1 (27)
Now we can search for the general solution as the sum of a solution of the
homogeneous equation plus a particular solution of the inhomogeneous equation.
The ￿rst step is the analysis of the homogeneous equation:
1
2
f￿(s)σ2s2 + f0 (s)s[α − γ] − f (s)[  + ρ − γ]+ f [(1 − φ)s] (28)
The solution of (28) is again of the form f(s)=Asβ1, but now is the positive
solution to a slightly more complicated non-linear equation:
1
2
β (β − 1)σ2 + β [α − γ] − [  + ρ − γ]+ (1 − φ)
β =0 (29)
The value of β that satis￿es (29) and f(0) = 0 can be found numerically.
The general solution of (27) appears to be the following:
16f(s)=Asβ1 + π(s) (30)
where π(s) is a particular solution of (27).
It is possible to demonstrate that the study done until now, could be sim-
pli￿ed by reducing our analysis of the sum of two variables following stochastic
processes to the analysis of a combined brownian motion and a jump process
as shown in Dixit and Pindyck (pp. 167-173). In the same way the drift of the
jump process can be included in the drift of the brownian motion or erased. In




the solution of (27) is:
π (s)=
 (1 − φ)s
(ρ − α)(ρ − α +  )
+
s
(ρ − α + λ)
+
1




(ρ − α +  )
•
•






(ρ +  )
(32)
Thus the general solution is:
f(s)=Asβ1 +
s
(ρ − α +  )
•






(ρ +  )
(33)
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